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Abstract. One of the simplest methods for implementing quantum key distribution over
fiber-optic communication is the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with phase encoding (PE-
BB84 protocol), in which the sender uses phase modulation over double pulses from a laser
and the receiver uses a passive delayed interferometer. Using essentially the same setup and by
regarding a train of many pulses as a single block, one can carry out the so-called differential
quadrature phase shift (DQPS) protocol, which is a variant of differential phase shift (DPS)
protocols. Here we prove the security of the DQPS protocol based on an adaptation of proof
techniques for the BB84 protocol, which inherits the advantages arising from the simplicity
of the protocol, such as accommodating the use of threshold detectors and simple off-line
calibration methods for the light source. We show that the secure key rate of the DQPS protocol
in the proof is eight thirds as high as the rate of the PE-BB84 protocol.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) aims to realize private communication securely from an
adversary with unlimited power, using the properties of quantum mechanics. Among many
applications of quantum information, the QKD is relatively matured from both theoretical and
experimental aspects, with a lot of practical demonstrations already conducted [1, 2]. From
a practical viewpoint, it is desired that a QKD protocol is implemented with a conventional
laser as its light source, and with simple hardware for encoding, decoding and detection.
The simplicity is desired not only because of a lower cost and a higher clock rate, but
also because complicated systems and procedures tend to impose severe restrictions on the
model of the sender’s and the receiver’s apparatus, and to suffer from inefficiency in short-
time communications due to a large overhead involved in statistical estimations. The BB84
protocol with phase encoding (Phase-encoding BB84, PE-BB84 henceforth) [3,4], which uses
four relative phases {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } between two neighboring pulses, is one of the simplest QKD
implementations suited for communication over optical fibers. In the PE-BB84 protocol,
the sender only needs a phase modulator for encoding, while the receiver only needs a
passive Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two detectors. With its established security [5–8],
a number of demonstrations have so far been reported [9–11].
For long-distance communication, the laser-based BB84 protocol suffers from photon-
number splitting (PNS) attacks [12]. It is often used with decoy-state method [13, 14] to
add protection against such attacks, but the decoy-state method sacrifices the simplicity of
the PE-BB84 protocol and benefits associated with it, requiring additional devices as well
as severer physical assumptions on the light source. In contrast, the differential-phase-shift
(DPS) QKD [15] was proposed to achieve protection from the PNS attacks while retaining (or
even improving) the simplicity of the PE-BB84 protocol. The DPS protocol uses two relative
phases {0, pi} between every neighboring pair of pulses belonging to a long train of pulses, and
demonstration with a high clock rate was conducted [16]. Although its security was proved
and the robustness against PNS attacks was verified, so far the key generation rate is much
smaller than the decoy-BB84 protocol [17]. A new approach to improve the key rate was also
proposed [18] and demonstrated [19–22] recently, but it requires an additional element in the
receiver’s apparatus to measure relative phases between pulses at different intervals.
In this article, we seek after the benefit of the DPS QKD in a different direction, namely,
for short-distance communication in which a PNS attack does not impose a severe problem.
We provide a security proof of a variant of the DPS QKD called differential quadrature phase
shift (DQPS) protocol [23], and establish that it has a definite advantage over the PE-BB84
protocol. The DQPS protocol can be implemented with essentially the same hardware as the
PE-BB84 protocol, but our security proof shows that its key generation rate is 8/3 as high
as that of the PE-BB84 protocol. The benefit from the simplicity of PE-BB84 protocol is
not sacrificed because the requirement for the properties of the light source and the detection
apparatus is shown to be kept to minimum as in the PE-BB84 protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe details of the DQPS protocol
and assumptions on the light source and the detection apparatus. Sec. 3 gives the security
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proof of the protocol, and shows an explicit formula for the key rate. Based on the formula,
numerical results for the secure key rate is shown in Sec. 4. Finally, Sec. 5 deals with
discussions including an analytical expression for the scaling of the optimal key rate.
2. Protocol
Figure 1. Setup for the L-pulse DQPS protocol. At Alice’s site, pulse trains are generated
by a laser followed by phase randomization as well as phase modulation (PM) with {0, pi} or
{ pi2 , 3pi2 } according to her random bits and basis choice. At Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to
a delayed Mach-Zehnder interferometer with phase shift 0 or pi2 according to his basis choice.
The trains leaving the interferometer are measured by two photon detectors corresponding
to bit values “0” and “1”. Valid timings of detection are labeled by integers 1, 2, .., L − 1,
according to the index of the pulse from the short arm of the interferometer. Detection from
interference between pulses from different blocks is regarded as invalid and ignored.
Here we introduce a DQPS protocol considered in this work, which is slightly modified
from the one [23] proposed by Inoue and Iwai (See Fig. 1). The protocol uses two bases, data
basis for generating the final key and check basis for monitoring the leak of information. In
the data and check bases, relative phases between adjacent pulses are modulated by {0, pi} and
{pi2 , 3pi2 }, respectively. The protocol regards a train of L pulses as a block, and the working basis
is randomly chosen for each block. The randomization of overall optical phase is also done
for each block of L pulses. Bob’s receiver is composed of delayed interferometer with its
delay being equal to the interval ∆τ of adjacent pulses. The longer arm of the interferometer
passes through a phase modulator that incurs phase shift θB = 0 or pi2 . After the interferometer,
the pulses are measured by two photon detectors corresponding to bit values “0” and “1”. If
there is a detection from the superposition of the l-th and the (l− 1)-th original pulses, we call
it as valid detection at l-th timing (1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1).
The protocol proceeds as follows, which includes predetermined parameters p1 > 0,
p0 ≔ 1 − p1, µ > 0, and nrep. In its description, |κ| represents the length of a bit sequence κ.
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1. Alice selects a bit c ∈ {0, 1} with probability p0 and p1, which correspond to the choice of
data basis and check basis, respectively. Bob also selects d ∈ {0, 1} with probability p0 and
p1.
2. Alice generates L random bits al ∈ {0, 1} (0, 1, .., L − 1), and prepares L optical pulses
(system S ) in the state
L−1⊗
l=0
|eiθl(al ,c) √µ〉S ,l , θl(al, c) ≔ alpi +
pi
2
lc, (1)
where | √µ〉S ,l represents coherent state e−µ/2
∑
k
µk/2√
k! |k〉S ,l of the l-th pulse mode. Alice ran-
domizes the overall optical phase of the L-pulse train, and sends it to Bob.
3. If d = 0, Bob sets θB = 0. If d = 1, he sets θB = pi2 .
4. If there is no detection of photons in the valid timings, Bob sets j = 0. If the detections
have only occurred at a single valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If
there are detections at multiple timings, the smallest (earliest) index of them is assigned to j.
If j , 0, Bob determines his raw key bit b ∈ {0, 1} depending on which detector has reported
detection at the j-th timing. If both detectors have reported at the j-th timing, a random bit is
assigned to b. Bob announces j through the public channel.
5. If j , 0, Alice determines her raw key bit as a = a j−1 ⊕ a j.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times. They publicly disclose c and d for
each of the nrep rounds.
7-1. Alice and Bob define sifted keys κA1 and κB1, respectively, by concatenating their deter-
mined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 1. They publicly disclose κA1 and κB1.
7-2. Alice defines a sifted key κA0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0.
7-3. Bob defines a sifted key κB0 by concatenating his determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0.
8. Bob corrects the errors in his sifted key κB0 to make it coincide with Alice’s key κA0 through
|κA0| fEC bits of encrypted public communication from Alice by consuming the same length of
pre-obtained secret key. Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shortening their keys
by |κA0| fPA to obtain the final keys.
In this paper, we only consider the secure key rate in the asymptotic limit of an infinite
sifted key length. We consider the limit of nrep →∞ while the following observed parameters
are fixed:
Q ≔ |κA0|
nrep p20
, E0 ≔
wt(κB0 − κA0)
nrep p20
, E1 ≔
wt(κB1 − κA1)
nrep p21
, (2)
where the minus sign is a bit-by-bit modulo-2 subtraction and wt(κ) represents the weight, the
number of 1’s, of a bit sequence κ. In this limit, fEC is given by a function of the bit error rate
E0/Q. In Sec. 3, the asymptotic value of fPA is determined as a function of Q and E1. The
asymptotic key rate per pulse RL is then given by
RL =
p20
L
Q(1 − fPA(Q, E1) − fEC(E0/Q)). (3)
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To be precise, the protocol must include the procedure for estimating the value of E0/Q. We
have omitted it in the above protocol because it is simply done by a random sampling test on
the sifted keys κA0 and κB0, and its cost is negligible in the asymptotic key rate.
The security of the above protocol is proved in Sec. 3 under the following assumptions
on the devices used by Alice and Bob. For clarity, in the main body of the paper up to Sec. 4,
we assume that Alice’s laser source and modulator produces the states in Eq. (1) precisely.
The assumption on the laser will then be relaxed in Sec. 5. The randomization of the overall
phase in Step 2 is assumed to be done by choosing a common optical phase shift φ randomly
from the continuous range of [0, 2pi), and applying it to all the L pulses. This eliminates the
coherence among different photon-number states. The state emitted from Alice in Step 2 is
thus expressed as
∑
m
ˆNm(
L−1⊗
l=0
|eiθl(al,c) √µ〉S ,l 〈eiθl(al ,c)
√
µ| ) ˆNm, (4)
where ˆNm represents the projector onto the subspace with m photons in the L pulses.
As for Bob’s apparatus, we assume that he uses threshold detectors, and further assume
that the inefficiency and dark countings of the detectors are equivalently represented by an
absorber and a stray photon source placed in front of Bob’s apparatus, and hence they are
included in the quantum channel. This allows us to regard each of the detectors in Fig. 1
as a perfect threshold detector, which reports detection if and only if it receives one or
more photons. To represent a relevant consequence of that assumption in a useful form, we
introduce POVM (positive operator valued measure) elements for Bob’s procedure in Steps 3
and 4. Let { ˆB(d)j } j=0,...,L−1 be the POVM for Bob’s procedure of determining j, when the basis
d was selected in Step 1. We further decompose the elements for j , 0 as ˆB(d)j = ˆB(d)j,0 + ˆB(d)j,1 ,
where ˆB(d)j,b corresponds to the outcome ( j, b). These operators satisfy
ˆB(d)0 +
L−1∑
j=1
( ˆB(d)j,0 + ˆB(d)j,1) = ˆ1. (5)
Under the model of detectors mentioned above, whether there is a detection or not at each
timing does not depend on the phase shift applied on the long arm. Hence, the procedure to
determine j is the same for d = 0 and d = 1, and we have
ˆB(0)j = ˆB
(1)
j (0 ≤ j ≤ L − 1), (6)
which will be used in the security proof given in the next section.
3. Security proof
Here we prove the security of the protocol introduced in Sec. 2 and determine the amount of
privacy amplification fPA(Q, E1) in the asymptotic limit. Our proof is based on the security
analysis with complementarity [8] as well as the tagging technique [7]. For the security proof
with complementarity, we consider an alternative protocol in which Alice’s sifted key κA0 are
obtained from measurements on auxiliary qubits on a basis (X basis), while Bob, instead of
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aiming to learn κA0, tries to guess the value of the complementary observable (the outcome
of Y-basis measurement) for Alice’s qubits. The alternative protocol is designed to fulfill the
following conditions:
(i) Alice’s procedure of releasing optical pulses, making her public announcement κA1, and
producing the final key is identical to the actual protocol.
(ii) Bob’s procedure of receiving L pulses and making his public announcement j (for each
round) and κB1 in the actual protocol is identical to the corresponding procedure in the alter-
native protocol.
Note that the condition (ii) does not prohibit Bob from making “additional” public announce-
ment that is not made in the actual protocol. The conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that any attack
strategy by Eve in the actual protocol can also be applicable to the alternative protocol by
ignoring the additional announcement, resulting in the identical correlation between Alice’s
final key and Eve’s quantum system. Hence, Alice’s final key in the actual protocol is secure
(random and decoupled from Eve’s system) if that in the alternative protocol is secure against
Eve’s general attack.
Now we introduce an alternative protocol satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). In the
protocol, Alice correlates an auxiliary qubit to each optical pulse. We define X, Y , and Z
bases for a qubit as follows. The Z basis is the standard basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, and a controlled-
NOT (CNOT) gate ˆU( j)CNOT appearing in the protocol below is defined on this basis by
ˆU( j)CNOT |x〉A, j |y〉A, j−1 = |x〉A, j |x + y mod 2〉A, j−1 (x, y ∈ {0, 1}). The X basis is {|+〉 , |−〉}, where
|±〉 ≔ (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. When we represent an outcome of the X basis measurement by
a bit, it should be understood that state |+〉 corresponds to bit value 0 and state |−〉 to 1.
Similarly, we define the Y basis as {|−i〉 , |+i〉}, with |±i〉 ≔ (|0〉 ± i |1〉)/√2, where we adopt
an unconventional rule that |+i〉 corresponds to bit value 1 and |−i〉 to 0 for the convenience of
the proof.
The detail of the alternative protocol is described below, where a step including a differ-
ent procedure from the actual protocol is marked with an asterisk (*).
Alternative protocol.
1. Alice selects a bit c ∈ {0, 1} with probability p0 and p1, which correspond to the choice of
data basis and check basis, respectively. Bob also selects d ∈ {0, 1} with probability p0 and
p1.
2∗. Alice prepares L auxiliary qubits (system A) and L optical pulses (system S ) in state
|Ψ(c)〉AS ≔
L−1⊗
l=0
|ψ(c)〉AS ,l (7)
depending on her basis choice, where
|ψ(c)〉AS ,l ≔
1√
2
(|+〉A,l |ei
pi
2 lc
√
µ〉S ,l + |−〉A,l |−ei
pi
2 lc
√
µ〉S ,l). (8)
She measures the total photon number m in the L pulses with the projective measurement
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{ ˆNm}, and sends the L pulses to Bob.
3∗. Bob sets θB = pi2 regardless of the value of d.
4. If there is no detection of photons in the valid timings, Bob sets j = 0. If the detections
have only occurred at a single valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If
there are detections at multiple timings, the smallest (earliest) index of them is assigned to j.
If j , 0, Bob determines his raw key bit b ∈ {0, 1} depending on which detector has reported
detection at the j-th timing. If both detectors have reported at the j-th timing, a random bit is
assigned to b. Bob announces j through the public channel.
5-1∗. If j = 0, proceed to Step 6. Otherwise, Alice operates a CNOT gate ˆU( j)CNOT on the
( j − 1)-th qubit (target) and the j-th qubit (control).
5-2∗. Alice measures all the qubits but the j-th one on Z basis {|0〉A,l , |1〉A,l} to obtain the
outcomes zl (l , j).
5-3∗. Alice measures the j-th qubit on X basis {|+〉A, j , |−〉A, j} and determines her raw key bit
a accordingly.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times. They publicly disclose c and d for
each of the nrep rounds.
7-1. Alice and Bob define sifted keys κA1 and κB1, respectively, by concatenating their deter-
mined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 1. They publicly disclose κA1 and κB1.
7-2. Alice defines a sifted key κA0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0.
7-3∗. Bob defines a sifted key κ∗B0 by concatenating his determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0. He publicly discloses κ∗B0.
8∗. Alice conducts privacy amplification by shortening her key by |κA0| fPA to obtain the final
key.
The above protocol satisfies the condition (ii) because of the following reasons. Since
Step 3∗ is identical to the actual protocol for d = 1, so is Bob’s announcement of κB1. The
change in Step 3∗ does not affect the announcement of j in each round due to Eq. (6). Note
that the change in Step 7-3∗ is an additional announcement which is not disclosed in the actual
protocol. In order to see that the condition (i) holds, we will modify the alternative protocol
in such a way that Alice’s procedure dictated in (i) is unchanged. Since the outcomes {zl} in
Step 5-2∗ are neither announced nor used in determining the final key, we can omit this step.
Since a CNOT gate on Z basis is equivalent to a CNOT gate on X basis with target and control
exchanged, Steps 5-1∗ and 5-3∗ are equivalently done by measuring all the L qubits on X basis
to obtain L bits a0, a1, .., aL−1 as the outcome, and then setting a = a j−1 ⊕ a j. Since the X-basis
measurement on all the qubits does not require the knowledge of j, we may assume that it is
done in Step 2∗. Then, using the relation
A,l 〈±|ψ(c)〉AS ,l =
1√
2
|±ei pi2 lc √µ〉 , (9)
we see that the L-bit sequence a0, a1, .., aL−1 is random and conditioned on its value the emitted
state is identical to Eq. (4). Hence, it is equivalent to Steps 2 and 5 of the actual protocol.
Finally, Steps 7-3∗ and 8∗ are the same as in the actual protocol as far as Alice is concerned.
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Therefore, the alternative protocol satisfies the condition (i), as well as (ii), which means that
the security of the alternative protocol implies the security of the actual protocol.
To prove the security of the alternative protocol, we first use the tagging technique
proposed by Gottesmann et al. [7]. Their idea was to tag the incidents with multiphoton
emission, which are totally insecure in the BB84 protocol. In a similar vein, we might want
to tag the events where the ( j − 1)-th and j-th pulses include multiphotons upon emission.
However, the number of emitted photons in the two pulses is not well-defined due to the
phase coherence with other pulses. Instead, we define a rule to classify tagged (t = 1) and
untagged (t = 0) incidents in terms of variables well-defined in the alternative protocol:∑
l, j
zl = m → t = 0,
∑
l, j
zl < m → t = 1. (10)
Let κA0,untag be the concatenation of all the untagged bits in κA0, and define the ratio of tagged
incidents as
∆ ≔ 1 − |κA0,untag||κA0|
. (11)
According to [7], if a sufficient amount of privacy amplification on κA0,untag to make it secure is
given by |κA0,untag|gPA(Q, E1,∆), κA0 can be made to be secure by reducing its length by |κA0| fPA
if it satisfies
fPA(Q, E1) ≥ max
∆
(∆ + (1 − ∆)gPA(Q, E1,∆)). (12)
Let us discuss the implication of the condition Eq. (10) for the tagging, and derive
important relations that will be used in the subsequent proof of security. According to
Eq. (8), it is not difficult to see that A,l 〈0|ψ(c)〉AS ,l includes only even number of photons,
and A,l 〈1|ψ(c)〉AS ,l does odd number of photons. For convenience, let us define projectors
related to such a property by
ˆΥAS :=
L−1⊗
l=0
ˆΥ(l), ˆΥ(l) := ˆP(|0〉A,l)

∑
n:even
ˆP(|n〉S ,l)
+ ˆP(|1〉A,l)

∑
n:odd
ˆP(|n〉S ,l)
 , (13)
where ˆP(|·〉) = |·〉 〈·|. Notice that the initial state in Eq. (7) satisfies
ˆΥAS |Ψ(c)〉AS = |Ψ(c)〉AS . (14)
Thanks to the correlation specified by ˆΥAS , the measured quantities {zl} are related to the parity
of the photon numbers in the system S . To see this, let us define the projector corresponding
to the state of ml photons in the l-th pulse by
ˆN{ml} ≔
L−1⊗
l=0
ˆP(|ml〉S ,l). (15)
Alice’s procedure of determining {zl} (l , j) at Steps 5-1∗ and 5-2∗ will be associated with the
projector defined by
ˆF( j){zl} ≔ ˆU
( j)†
CNOT
 ˆ1A, j ⊗
(⊗
l, j
ˆP(|zl〉A,l)
) ˆU( j)CNOT
=
[
ˆP(|0〉A, j−1 |z j−1〉A, j) + ˆP(|1〉A, j−1 |1 − z j−1〉A, j)
] ⊗
l, j−1, j
ˆP(|zl〉A,l). (16)
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Then, it is easy to confirm that
( ˆF( j){zl} ⊗ ˆN{ml}) ˆΥAS , 0
only if zl = ml mod 2 (l , j − 1, j) and z j−1 = m j−1 + m j mod 2. (17)
Since ˆNm ˆN{ml} = 0 unless
∑
l ml = m, we have
( ˆF( j){zl} ⊗ ˆNm ˆN{ml}) ˆΥAS , 0
only if zl ≤ ml (l , j − 1, j), z j−1 ≤ m j−1 + m j and
∑
l
ml = m. (18)
If we confine ourselves to the case with ∑l, j zl = m, the condition in the above equation is
satisfied only by zl = ml (l , j − 1, j) and z j−1 = m j−1 + m j. We thus conclude that
( ˆF( j){zl} ⊗ ˆNm) ˆΥAS = ( ˆF
( j)
{zl} ⊗ ˆΞ
( j)
{zl}) ˆΥAS for
∑
l, j
zl = m, (19)
where
ˆΞ
( j)
{zl} :=
ˆP(|0〉S , j−1 |0〉S , j)
⊗
l, j−1, j
ˆP(|zl〉S ,l) for z j−1 = 0 (20)
ˆΞ
( j)
{zl} := [ ˆP(|0〉S , j−1 |1〉S , j) + ˆP(|1〉S , j−1 |0〉S , j)]
⊗
l, j−1, j
ˆP(|zl〉S ,l) for z j−1 = 1. (21)
This may lead to an interpretation that, whenever the event is untagged, every pulse should
have contained no more than one photon upon emission, and the ( j − 1)-th and the j-th pulse
pair contained no more than one photon in total. On the other hand, we should also take
notice that Alice’s measurement of {zl} (l , j) in the alternative protocol can be carried out
only after the pulse train was measured by Bob and the value of j was announced. Hence
the above interpretation has an ambiguity in the operational sense, which is why we only use
strict mathematical statements of Eqs. (14) and (19) in the subsequent proof and do not rely
on the interpretation.
Our next goal is to determine the amount of privacy amplification gPA(Q, E1,∆) to make
the untagged portion of the key secure, using the proof based on complementarity [8]. In that
proof, we consider a measurement which is complementary to the measurement on the qubits
to determine the sifted key κA0,untag. Let us introduce the following procedure instead of the
Steps 5-3∗ and 7-2.
5-3∗∗. If c = 1, Alice measures the j-th qubit on X basis {|+〉A, j , |−〉A, j} and determines her raw
key bit a accordingly. If c = 0, Alice measures the j-th qubit on Y basis {|−i〉A, j , |+i〉A, j} and
determines her raw key bit a accordingly.
7-2∗∗. Alice defines a sifted key κ∗A0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0.
Suppose that we have a bound δuntag(Q, E1,∆), which asymptotically satisfies
δuntag(Q, E1,∆) ≥
wt(κ∗B0,untag − κ∗A0,untag)
|κ∗A0,untag|
, (22)
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where κ∗A0,untag and κ∗B0,untag are the concatenations of all the untagged bits in κ∗A0 and κ∗B0,
respectively. Notice that the measurement on Alice’s qubits for extracting κA0 or κ∗A0 can be
postponed until after Step 7-3∗, namely, after she learns the values of Q, E1,∆ and κ∗B0,untag.
Then, an extreme case of δuntag(Q, E1,∆) = 0 will mean that the state of |κA0,untag| untagged
qubits before the measurement is exactly a Y-basis eigenstate specified by κ∗B0,untag, and hence
κA0,untag, which is an outcome of X-basis measurement, is secure (random and decoupled from
Eve’s system). For a nonzero value of δuntag(Q, E1,∆), we need a privacy amplification to
make it secure, and a sufficient amount in the asymptotic limit was derived in [8] as
gPA(Q, E1,∆) = h(δuntag(Q, E1,∆)) (23)
for δuntag(Q, E1,∆) ≤ 1/2, where h(x) ≔ −log2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) represents the binary
entropy function.
It can be shown that δuntag is connected to the check-basis error rate E1 of the actual
protocol through random sampling. For given values of c and j, Alice’s procedure of
determining {zl} and a at Steps 5-1∗, 5-2∗ and 5-3∗∗ corresponds to the projection onto the
state |A(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A, which is defined by
|A(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A ≔
1√
2
ˆU( j)†CNOT

(
|0〉A, j − (−1)a i c+1 |1〉A, j
)⊗
l, j
|zl〉A,l
 . (24)
Since these states satisfy
ˆF( j){zl} |A
(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A = |A
(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A , (25)
Eqs. (19) and (25) lead to
A 〈A(c, j)a,{zl}| ˆNm ˆΥAS = A 〈A
(c, j)
a,{zl}| ˆΞ
( j)
{zl}
ˆΥAS for
∑
l, j
zl = m. (26)
From Eq. (14), we have
A 〈A(c, j)a,{zl}| ˆNm |Ψ(c)〉AS = A 〈A
(c, j)
a,{zl}| ˆΞ
( j)
{zl} |Ψ(c)〉AS for
∑
l, j
zl = m. (27)
The basis-choice dependence of states |A(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A and |Ψ(c)〉AS can be represented by
|A(c, j)
a,{zl}〉A =
(
ˆP(|0〉A, j) + i c ˆP(|1〉A, j)
)
|A(0, j)
a,{zl}〉A (28)
and
|Ψ(c)〉AS =

L−1⊗
l=0
i lmˆlc
 |Ψ(0)〉AS , (29)
where mˆl :=
∑
m m ˆP(|m〉l) is the photon number operator for the l-th pulse. Since the range of
the projector ˆΞ( j){zl} includes only zero- or one-photon states for each mode, we have
[( ˆP(|0〉A, j) + (−i)c ˆP(|1〉A, j)) ⊗ ˆΞ( j){zl}] ˆΥAS = (−i)cmˆ j ˆΞ
( j)
{zl}
ˆΥAS . (30)
Combining Eqs. (14), (28), (29) and (30), we obtain
A 〈A(c, j)a,{zl}| ˆΞ
( j)
{zl} |Ψ(c)〉AS = A 〈A
(0, j)
a,{zl}| (−i)mˆ jc

L−1⊗
l=0
i lmˆlc
 ˆΞ( j){zl} |Ψ(0)〉AS . (31)
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Using the definition of Eqs. (20) and (21), it is easy to confirm that
(−i)cmˆ j

L−1⊗
l=0
i lmˆlc
 ˆΞ( j){zl} = i ( j−1)z j−1c

∏
l, j−1, j
i lzlc
 ˆΞ( j){zl} (32)
holds. Therefore, we have
A 〈A(0, j)a,{zl}| ˆΞ
( j)
{z j−1} |Ψ(0)〉AS = (−i)u( j)A 〈A
(1, j)
a,{zl}| ˆΞ
( j)
{z j−1} |Ψ(1)〉AS , (33)
where u( j) ≔ ∑l, j−1, j lzl + ( j − 1)z j−1 and this leads, with Eq. (27), to
A 〈A(0, j)a,{zl}| ˆNm |Ψ(0)〉AS = (−i)u( j)A 〈A
(1, j)
a,{zl}| ˆNm |Ψ(1)〉AS for
∑
l, j
zl = m. (34)
This relation may suggest that for untagged incidents, the state of pulses transmitted from
Alice would be independent of the value of c, and hence the c = d = 1 incidents would
be regarded as a fair sampling. Again, this interpretation suffers from ambiguity since the
protocol assumes that Alice’s qubits are measured only after the optical pulses are received by
Bob and the value of j is announced. Therefore we need a mathematical proof for the fairness
of the sampling, which is given in Appendix A. The proof confirms that
wt(κ∗B0,untag − κ∗A0,untag)
wt(κB1,untag − κA1,untag) =
(
p0
p1
)2
(35)
holds in the limit of nrep → ∞. Then we have
wt(κ∗B0,untag − κ∗A0,untag)
|κ∗A0,untag|
=
(
p0
p1
)2 wt(κB1,untag − κA1,untag)
|κ∗A0,untag|
≤
(
p0
p1
)2
wt(κB1 − κA1)
|κ∗A0,untag|
=
E1
Q(1 − ∆) . (36)
We thus conclude that asymptotically a privacy amplification with a ratio
gPA(Q, E1,∆) = h
( E1
Q(1 − ∆)
)
(37)
is enough to make the untagged portion of the sifted key secure.
Since the argument of the max in Eq. (12) with Eq. (37) is an increasing function of ∆ for
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1− (2E1/Q), fPA will be determined through finding an upperbound on ∆. According
to the definition of Eq. (11), what we need is a lower bound on |κA0,untag|, which is determined
as follows. If we denote by n(condition) the number of rounds satisfying the condition in
the nrep rounds repeated in the alternative protocol, we have |κA0| = n(c = d = 0, j , 0) and
|κA0,untag| = n(c = d = 0, j , 0, t = 0), where t = 0 is equivalent to ∑l, j zl = m according
to Eq. (10). Under a given attack strategy of Eve, the statistics of n(c = d = 0, j , 0) and
n(c = d = 0, j , 0, t = 0) is unchanged if we omit Step 5-3∗ and stop the protocol at Step 6.
We may further equivalently replace Steps 5-1∗ and 5-2∗ with a procedure of measuring the L
qubits on the Z basis {|0〉A,l , |1〉A,l} to obtain the outcomes z′0, · · · z′L−1, followed by substitutions
zl := z
′
l (l , j − 1, j) and z j−1 := z′j−1 + z′j mod 2 in case of j , 0. Let us define a set of values
of L nonnegative integers as
Γ(m) := {(k0, · · · , kL−1)|kl−1 + kl ≤ 1(1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1),
L−1∑
l=0
kl = m}, (38)
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and operators associated with it by
ˆΠ
(m)
A :=
∑
{z′l }∈Γ(m)
L−1⊗
l=0
ˆP(|z′l〉A,l), ˆΠ(m)S :=
∑
{ml}∈Γ(m)
L−1⊗
l=0
ˆP(|ml〉S ,l). (39)
We see that (z′0, · · · z′L−1) ∈ Γ(m) implies
∑
l, j zl = m regardless of the value of j, as long as
j , 0. Hence we have
n(c = d = 0, j , 0, t = 0)
≥ n(c = d = 0, j , 0, (z′0, · · · z′L−1) ∈ Γ(m))
= n(c = d = 0, j , 0) − n(c = d = 0, j , 0, (z′0, · · · z′L−1) < Γ(m))
≥ n(c = d = 0, j , 0) − n(c = d = 0, (z′0, · · · z′L−1) < Γ(m)). (40)
The number n(c = d = 0, (z′0, · · · z′L−1) < Γ(m)) is independent of Eve’s strategy, and it follows
the binomial distribution with success probability p20rtag with
rtag ≔ 1 −
∑
m
AS 〈Ψ(0)| ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆNm |Ψ(0)〉AS . (41)
Since z′l = ml mod 2 and (m0, . . . ,mL−1) ∈ Γ(m) imply (z′0, · · · z′L−1) ∈ Γ(m), we have
ˆΠ
(m)
S
ˆΥAS = ( ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆΠ(m)S ) ˆΥAS . On the other hand, z′l = ml mod 2 and
∑
l z
′
l =
∑
l ml imply
z′l = ml, which leads to ( ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆNm) ˆΥAS = ( ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆΠ(m)S ) ˆΥAS . We thus obtain
( ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆNm) ˆΥAS = ˆΠ(m)S ˆΥAS . (42)
Combined with Eq. (14), we obtain
rtag = 1 −
∑
m
AS 〈Ψ(0)| ˆΠ(m)S |Ψ(0)〉AS , (43)
which gives us a clear interpretation of quantity rtag being the probability that the L-pulse train
emitted from Alice contains at least two photons in the same pulse or in neighboring pulses.
As a function of µ, it is calculated as
rtag = 1 −
⌈L/2⌉∑
m=0
e−µLµm
(L + 1 − m)!
m!(L + 1 − 2m)! . (44)
In the asymptotic limit of nrep → ∞, Eq. (40) implies
n(c = d = 0, j , 0, t = 0)
nrep
≥ n(c = d = 0, j , 0)
nrep
− p20rtag, (45)
which means that |κA0,untag|/nrep ≥ |κA0|/nrep − p20rtag. Using Eqs. (2) and (11), we have
∆ ≤ rtagQ . (46)
Hence, for rtag ≤ Q − 2E1, choosing
fPA(Q, E1) =
rtag
Q +
(
1 − rtagQ
)
h
(
E1
Q − rtag
)
(47)
makes the alternative protocol, and hence the actual protocol, secure. An achievable
asymptotic key rate per pulse is thus given by
RL =
p20
L
(
(Q − rtag)(1 − h
( E1
Q − rtag
)
) − Q fEC(E0/Q)
)
(48)
whenever the right-hand side is positive.
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4. Key rates
We show results of numerical calculation of the key rate per pulse RL given by Eq. (48) to
compare the conventional passive PE-BB84 protocol (L=2) and the DQPS protocol (L ≥ 3).
In Fig. 2, dependence of RL on overall transmission η (including detector efficiency) is shown
for L = 2, 4, 20. For channel with transmission η, we assumed Q = 1 − e−(L−1)µη, reflecting
the fact that there are (L − 1) valid timings per block of pulses. The observed error rates of
the sifted key E0/Q and E1/Q were both set to be 3%, regardless of η and µ. We also adopted
fEC(E0/Q) = h(E0/Q) and p0 = 1. The key rate RL was then optimized over µ for each value
of η. From Fig. 2, we see that, RL for different values of L are all proportional to η2 in the limit
of small η, but its coefficient increases as L gets larger. For example, at −10log10η = 20, we
found that R20/R2  2.67, which clearly shows an advantage of the DQPS protocol over the
PE-BB84 protocol when we use essentially the same hardware. We also see that even in the
limit of no loss (η→ 1), the DQPS protocol with L = 4 is superior to the PE-BB84 protocol.
Figure 2. Secure key rate per pulse RL as a function of the overall channel transmission η. The
bit error rate of the sifted key is fixed to be 3% for both bases. The block size L is chosen to
be 2, 4, and 20, where L = 2 corresponds to the PE-BB84 protocol and the other values to the
DQPS protocol.
5. Discussion
Figure 2 shows that the optimized key rates are proportional to η2 in the limit of η → 0,
with its coefficient dependent on the block size L. In the special case where the bit error rate
is zero, we can analytically determine the coefficient as a function of L. For Lµ2 ≪ 1, the
parameter rtag in Eq. (44) is approximated as rtag = 3L−22 µ2. For Lµη ≪ 1, the parameter Q
is approximated as Q = (L − 1)µη. Hence, for Lη2 ≪ 1, the key rate RL = (Q − rtag)/L is
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optimized at µ = µopt ≔ L−13L−2η to attain the optimal value R
opt
L ≔
(L−1)2
2L(3L−2)η
2
. In the limit of a
large block size, we have RoptL→∞ = η2/6 and R
opt
L→∞/R
opt
2 = 8/3. The result seems interesting in
the sense that the secure key rate for a large value of L is more than twice as large as that of
L = 2 while the inherent loss in the passive interferometer itself is 1/2 for L = 2. On the other
hand, it does not mean that the key rate exceeds the case of L = 2 without the interferometer
loss, namely, implementation with an ideal active optical switch. Since RoptL ∝ η2 holds in the
limit of small η, the key rate of an ideal active protocol is 4 times the rate of the passive one
for L = 2. If the loss in the optical switch is taken into account, the passive DQPS protocol is
more efficient than the active PE-BB84 protocol when the loss of optical switch is larger than
∼ 20%.
While we have assumed so far that the initial pure state represented in Eq. (1) is prepared
by Alice, the proof can be extended to a general light source, which is shown in Appendix
B. The proof there assumes that the phase modulator (PM in Fig. 1) works perfectly, and
that every L-pulse train from the source is independent and represented by the same density
operator σˆS (not necessarily identical for each pulse). For the general light source described
above, the secure key rate is still given by Eq. (48) with
rtag = 1 −
∑
m
tr
(
ˆΠ
(m)
S σˆS
)
. (49)
Even when the state σˆS of the L pulse train is unknown, an upper bound on rtag can
be determined from an off-line coincidence measurement on the light source using a few
detectors. As shown in Appendix C, the calibration method reveals an upper bound that is
close to the true value of rtag, as long as the state from the source is close to a coherent state
with its mean photon number µ ≪ L−1/2.
Although the key rate of the DQPS protocol can be improved by using decoy-state
method, it is less effective as L gets larger, because only the statistics of the total number of
photons emitted in the L pulses are obtained and no further information on their distribution
over the L pulses is available. On the other hand, the decoy state BB84 protocol uses the
knowledge on the probability of higher photon numbers from the light source, which will
require more complicated devices for calibration. Since the calibration of the light source in
the DQPS protocol is almost as simple as that of PE-BB84, the DQPS protocol will be useful
for the practical cases where one prefers a simple setup for short distance communication [24].
Another possible improvement of our result may be obtained from the expected
robustness of general DPS protocols against PNS attacks. In the DPS protocols (including
the DQPS protocol), Eve’s attempts to control the timing of detection j tends to increase the
probability of a bit error, which is expected to result in the robustness against PNS attacks. In
a security proof of the DPS protocol [17], the robustness can be seen as a η 32 -dependence of
the key rate in the range of small η. In contrast, our key rate of the DQPS protocol scales as
η2. This is because our proof assumed the pessimistic assumption that Eve is able to control
the value of j without causing any bit error. If we analyze the security based on the proof
technique for the DPS protocol [17], our protocol may benefit from the robustness against
PNS attacks without using decoy states.
As a conclusion, we have proved the security of differential quadrature phase shift
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(DQPS) quantum key distribution protocol, which can be implemented with almost the same
setup as the phase-encoding (PE) BB84 protocol. The proof is based on the a careful
adaptation of the tagging idea and the complementarity argument. We found that the key
generation rate exceeds that of the PE-BB84 protocol for any channel transmission, and is 8/3
as high as the rate of the PE-BB84 protocol in the limit of small transmission.
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Appendix A. Untagged check-basis outcomes as an unbiased sample
Here, we prove Eq. (35) in the main text by showing that the untagged rounds with c = 1
can be regarded as a random sample extracted from the whole untagged events. For fixed
c, j (, 0) and m, define a projector ˆT (c, j,m)a,t ≔
∑
{zl} |A(c, j)a,{zl}〉A 〈A
(c, j)
a,{zl}| where the summation is
over {zl} satisfying
∑
l, j zl = m for t = 0 and
∑
l, j zl < m for t = 1. The projector ˆT (c, j,m)a,t can be
regarded as the POVM element for the measurement on system A to determine a and t through
Steps 5-1∗, 5-2∗, and 5-3∗∗ with the rule of Eq. (10). Although the protocol does not define the
values of a, b, and t in case of j = 0, it simplifies the notations if we also define those values
to be a = b = t = 0 for j = 0, and define ˆT (c,0,m)a,t accordingly. We label each of the nrep rounds
by r = 1, 2, . . . , nrep, and use cr, ar, br, jr,mr, tr to denote the values of c, a, b, j,m, t in the r-th
round. Let c, a, b, j, m, t be vectors with nrep elements corresponding to r = 1, 2, . . . , nrep.
With these notations, the procedure of determining these vectors in the alternative protocol
(with replacement 5-3∗∗) is summarized as follows.
i) Alice selects c randomly, prepares ρˆAS (c) ≔
⊗nrep
r=1 σˆAS (cr) with σˆAS (cr) ≔
|Ψ(cr)〉AS 〈Ψ(cr)|, and measures m by a projection measurement.
ii) Eve’s attack on nrep copies of system S followed by Bob’s measurement determines j
and b. For a given attack strategy by Eve, this whole procedure on nrep systems should be
represented by POVM with elements { ˆD j,b}.
iii) Given c, j, and m, Alice measures nrep copies of system A to obtain a and t, which is
represented by the POVM elements { ˆT (c, j,m)a,t ≔
⊗nrep
r=1
ˆT (cr , jr ,mr)ar ,tr }.
Let p(c) be the probability of vector c, and p(c, a, b, j, t) be the joint probability for the
five vectors. We then have
p(c, a, b, j, t) =
∑
m
p(c) tr
(
( ˆT (c, j,m)a,t ⊗ ˆD j,b)( ˆNmρˆAS (c) ˆNm)
)
. (A.1)
Let gt, j(c) be a function for fixed t and j defined as gt, j(c) = (c¯1, c¯2, ..c¯nrep) where c¯r = cr (tr=1
or jr = 0) and c¯r = 0 (tr=0 and jr , 0). From Eq. (34), for tr = 0 and jr , 0 we have
trA
(
( ˆT (0, jr ,mr)
ar ,0 ⊗ ˆ1S )( ˆNmr σˆAS (0) ˆNmr )
)
= trA
(
( ˆT (1, jr ,mr)
ar ,0 ⊗ ˆ1S )( ˆNmr σˆAS (1) ˆNmr )
)
,
(A.2)
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since σˆAS (cr) = |Ψ(cr)〉AS 〈Ψ(cr)|. Thus, for c, c′ satisfying gt, j(c) = gt, j(c′) = cconst, we have
trA
(
( ˆT (c, j,m)a,t ⊗ ˆ1S )( ˆNmρˆAS (c) ˆNm)
)
= trA
(
( ˆT (c′ , j,m)a,t ⊗ ˆ1S )( ˆNmρˆAS (c′) ˆNm)
)
. (A.3)
Therefore, Eq. (A.1) is written in the form p(c, a, b, j, t) = p(c)β(gt, j(c), a, b, j, t), which
leads to, for a given value of cconst, we obtain
p(c, a, b, j, t)∑
c′:gt, j(c′)=cconst p(c′, a, b, j, t)
=
p(c)β(cconst, a, b, j, t)∑
c′:gt, j(c′)=cconst p(c′)β(cconst, a, b, j, t)
=
p(c)∑
c′:gt, j(c′)=cconst p(c′)
(A.4)
for c satisfying gt, j(c) = cconst. Eq. (A.4) shows that for the rounds with t = 0 and j , 0, the
probability of obtaining c = 0, 1 is p0, p1 and is independent of the value of a, b, j. Therefore,
in the limit of nrep →∞,
n(c = 0, t = 0, a , b, j , 0)
n(c = 1, t = 0, a , b, j , 0) =
p0
p1
(A.5)
holds, where n(condition) denotes the number of rounds satisfying the condition in the nrep
rounds. Finally, notice that Bob conducts check-basis measurement regardless of the value of
d in the alternative protocol, and hence d is independent of the other variables. Therefore, we
have
n(c = d = 0, t = 0, a , b, j , 0)
n(c = d = 1, t = 0, a , b, j , 0) =
(
p0
p1
)2
, (A.6)
which corresponds to Eq. (35).
Appendix B. Security proof for a general light source
Here we show that our proof can be extended to the use of a general light source. Suppose
that the laser in Fig. 1 emits a train of L pulses in a general mixed state σˆS . We assume that
every train from the laser is independent and has the same state σˆS . We also assume that the
subsequent phase modulation is ideal. The state after the phase modulation, which was given
in Eq. (1) in the description of the actual protocol, is now given by
L−1⊗
l=0
exp(iθl(al, c)mˆl)
 σˆS

L−1⊗
l′=0
exp( − iθl′(al′ , c)mˆl′)
 , (B.1)
and the one after the randomization of the overall optical phase is
∑
m
ˆNm

L−1⊗
l=0
exp(iθl(al, c)mˆl)
 σˆS

L−1⊗
l′=0
exp( − iθl′(al′ , c)mˆl′)
 ˆNm (B.2)
instead of Eq. (4).
The security proof in Sec. 3 used the assumption of pure coherent states Eq. (1) in several
occasions, which are listed as follows:
i) The state preparation in the alternative protocol [Eq. (7)], and its relation [Eq. (9)] to the
actual protocol.
ii) The parity correlation [Eq. (14)] between the auxiliary qubits and the photon numbers in
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pulses.
iii) The derived properties [Eqs. (27), (29), (31), (33), (34) and (A.2)] for proving that the
sampling is unbiased as in Eq. (35).
iv) The expressions [Eqs. (41) and (43)] for the parameter rtag.
In what follows, we describe how each of the above arguments are rephrased in terms of the
general state σˆS .
i) In the alternative protocol, we assume that Alice prepares the following state on system
AS ,
σˆAS (c) ≔ ˆR(c)σˆS ˆR(c), (B.3)
instead of Eq. (7). Here ˆR(c) is defined by
ˆR(c) ≔
L−1⊗
l=0
[ 1√
2
(
|+〉A,l exp(i
pi
2
lcmˆl) + |−〉A,l exp(i(pi +
pi
2
lc)mˆl)
)]
. (B.4)
Then it is straightforward to confirm that
L−1⊗
l=0
A,l 〈±|
 σˆAS (c)

L−1⊗
l′=0
|±〉A,l′

=
1
2L

L−1⊗
l=0
exp(iθl(al, c)mˆl)
 σˆS

L−1⊗
l′=0
exp( − iθl′(al′ , c)mˆl′)
 , (B.5)
where ± of the l-th qubit should be chosen according to the bit al. This is the general-state
expression for Eq. (9), which leads to the equivalence of state preparation between the actual
and the alternative protocol.
ii) As ˆR(c) is written in Z basis as
ˆR(c) =
L−1⊗
l=0
[1
2
i lcmˆl
(
|0〉A,l ( ˆ1S ,l + (−1)mˆl) + |1〉A,l ( ˆ1S ,l − (−1)mˆl)
)]
=
L−1⊗
l=0
[
i lcmˆl
(
|0〉A,l
∑
ml:even
ˆP(|ml〉S ,l) + |1〉A,l
∑
ml:odd
ˆP(|ml〉S ,l)
)]
, (B.6)
we have
ˆΥAS ˆR(c) = ˆR(c), (B.7)
which is a generalization of Eq. (14). It immediately implies that ˆΥAS σˆAS (c) ˆΥAS = σˆAS (c),
which indicates a property of state σˆAS that the measurement outcome on Z basis {|0〉A,l , |1〉A,l}
always coincides with the parity of photon number in the l-th pulse.
iii) From (B.6), we have
ˆR(c) =

L−1⊗
l=0
i lcmˆl
 ˆR(0). (B.8)
Comparing Eqs. (14) and (29) to Eqs. (B.7) and (B.8), we see that the derived properties of
Eqs. (27), (31), and (33) for |Ψ(c)〉AS should also hold for ˆR(c). As a result, we obtain
A 〈A(0, j)a,{zl}| ˆNm ˆR(0) = (−i)u( j)A 〈A
(1, j)
a,{zl}| ˆNm ˆR(1) for
∑
l, j
zl = m (B.9)
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as a generalization of Eq. (34). From Eq. (B.9), we have
A 〈A(0, j)a,{zl}| ˆNmσˆAS (0) ˆNm |A
(0, j)
a,{zl}〉A = A 〈A
(1, j)
a,{zl}| ˆNmσˆAS (1) ˆNm |A
(1, j)
a,{zl}〉A
for
∑
l, j
zl = m, (B.10)
which assures that Eq. (A.2) is also true when σˆAS (c) is given by Eq. (B.3). Hence, Eq. (35)
holds.
iv) For the initial state given by Eq. (B.3), the definition of the parameter rtag of Eq. (41)
is replaced by
rtag = 1 −
∑
m
tr
(
( ˆΠ(m)A ⊗ ˆNm)σˆAS (0)
)
. (B.11)
Together with Eqs. (42) and (B.7), we have
rtag = 1 −
∑
m
tr
(
( ˆ1A ⊗ ˆΠ(m)S )σˆAS (0)
)
= 1 −
∑
m
tr
(
ˆΠ
(m)
S σˆS
)
. (B.12)
Appendix C. Calibration of light sources
Figure C1. Off-line calibration setup to determine an upper bound on rtag for a general light
source, when the dead time of detectors is shorter than pulse interval ∆τ. R and T represent
reflectance and transmittance of the beam splitter, respectively. η(1)det and η
(2)
det represent detection
efficiencies of detector 1 and 2, respectively.
Here we discuss how we may determine an upper bound on the parameter rtag, which is
given by Eq. (B.12), from an off-line experiment on the light source. We use a beam splitter
characterized by transmittance T and reflectance R and two threshold detectors with quantum
efficiencies η(1)det and η
(2)
det, as in Fig. C1. No precise values of these parameters are needed, and
we assume that there are known lower bounds η1 ≤ Tη(1)det and η2 ≤ Rη(2)det. For simplicity,
we neglect the effect of dark countings of the detectors. We assume that the dead time of
the detectors are shorter than the pulse interval such that they are ready for every incident
pulse. For an L pulse train emitted from the source, we record the timings of detection at the
two detectors, and define a double coincidence event to be the case when both detectors have
reported detections within a pair of neighboring pulses.
Since a state in the range of ˆ1 − ∑m Π(m)S contains at least two photons in a pair of
neighboring pulses, such a state has a probability of resulting in a double coincidence event
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no smaller than 2η1η2. Thus, if we repeat the measurement ntest times and find that double
coincidence events have occurred ndouble times, an upper bound on rtag is given by
r¯tag ≔
ndouble
ntest
1
2η1η2
≥ rtag, (C.1)
in the asymptotic limit of large ntest. Although the tightness of the upper bound r¯tag varies
depending on the state σˆS in general, we may show that it can be quite tight when the state is
close to an ideal coherent state. Suppose that η1 and η2 are equal to the actual efficiencies, and
each pulse is exactly in the coherent state with amplitude µ. For every pulse, detector 1 and
2 independently report detection with probability p(click)k = 1 − e−ηkµ ≤ ηkµ (k = 1, 2). Since
there are L + 2(L − 1) different combinations of timings leading to double coincidence, we
have
ndouble
ntest
≤ (3L − 2)p(click)1 p(click)2 ≤ η1η2µ2(3L − 2), (C.2)
which leads to
r¯tag ≤
µ2(3L − 2)
2
. (C.3)
On the other hand, direct calculation shows that, in the limit of Lµ2 → 0,
rtag = µ
2 3L − 2
2
+ µ3
(−10L + 12
3
)
+ µ4
(−9L2 + 82L − 120
8
)
+ O(L2µ5 + L3µ6)
= µ2
3L − 2
2
− µ3L
(9
8µL +
10
3
)
+ O(L2µ5 + L3µ6), (C.4)
which leads to
r¯tag − rtag
rtag
≤ µ
(3
4
µL +
20
9
)
+ O(Lµ3 + L2µ4). (C.5)
Hence, the bound r¯tag is a good approximation of rtag for µ ≪ L−1/2 .
Figure C2. Off-line calibration setup to determine an upper bound on rtag for a general
light source, when the dead time of detectors is longer than pulse interval ∆τ. An optical
linear absorber with transmittance ηabs is set in front of beam splitters. R(1), R(2), T (1) and T (2)
represent reflectance and transmittance of the two beam splitters. η(1)det, η
(2)
det and η
(3)
det represent
detection efficiencies of threshold detector 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
In a more practical case where the dead time (τdead) of the detectors is longer than the
pulse interval (τdead > ∆τ), there is a possibility that the presence of two photons is masked by
an earlier detection of a third photon. In such a case, we may use a setup in Fig. C2 with three
detectors and a linear absorber with transmittance ηabs. Assume that we know lowerbounds,
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η˜abs ≤ ηabs, η˜1 ≤ T (1)T (2)η(1)det, η˜2 ≤ T (1)R(2)η(2)det and η˜3 ≤ R(1)η(3)det. Define a triple coincidence
event to be the case when all three detectors has reported detections within the whole train of
L pulses. Let q3 be the probability that the L pulse train leaving the linear absorber contains
three or more photons. If we repeat the measurement ntest times and triple coincidence events
have occurred ntriple times, we have
q3 ≤
ntriple
ntest
1
6η˜1η˜2η˜3
(C.6)
in the limit of large ntest. Suppose that one records the number n(obs)double of double coincidence
events in the same ntest runs, which is defined as the case when detectors 1 and 2 have
reported detections within a pair of neighboring pulses. Since the effect of the dead time
can be simulated with a fictitious detector with no dead time by ignoring detection events that
occurred when the real detector would have been dead, we may consider the number n(true)double of
double coincidence events defined from these fictitious detectors. Since the two definitions of
a double coincidence event differs only when three or more photons are incident on the two
detectors, we have
n
(true)
double
ntest
≤ n
(obs)
double
ntest
+ q3 (C.7)
in the limit of large ntest. On the other hand, as in Eq. (C.1), n(true)double satisfies
rtag ≤ r¯tag =
n
(true)
double
ntest
1
2η1η2
(C.8)
by taking η1 = η˜absη˜1 and η2 = η˜absη˜2. We thus obtain an upper bound from Eqs. (C.6)-(C.8)
as
rtag ≤ r¯ ∗tag ≔
(n(obs)double
ntest
+
ntriple
ntest
1
6η˜1η˜2η˜3
) 1
2η˜1η˜2η˜2abs
. (C.9)
We show that r¯ ∗tag also approximates rtag well when the light source emits coherent pulses.
Suppose that η˜1, η˜2, η˜3 and η˜abs are equal to the actual efficiencies. Since n(obs)double ≤ n(true)double holds,
we have
r¯ ∗tag ≤ r¯tag +
ntriple
ntest
1
6η˜1η˜2η˜3
1
2η˜1η˜2η˜2abs
. (C.10)
From Eq. (C.5), we have
r¯ ∗tag − rtag
rtag
≤ µ
(3
4
µL +
20
9
)
+
ntriple
ntest
1
6η˜1η˜2η˜3
1
2η˜1η˜2η˜2abs
1
rtag
+ O(Lµ3 + L2µ4)
(C.11)
for Lµ2 → 0. Since L pulses incident on detector k lead to one or more detections at
probability p(click)k = 1 − e−η˜k η˜absLµ ≤ η˜kη˜absLµ, we have
ntriple
ntest
≤ η˜1η˜2η˜3(η˜absLµ)3. (C.12)
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Thus, we obtain
r¯ ∗tag − rtag
rtag
≤ µ
(3
4
µL +
20
9
)
+
(η˜absLµ)3
12η˜1η˜2η˜2abs
1
rtag
+ O(Lµ3 + L2µ4)
= µ
(3
4
µL +
20
9
)
+ µ
η˜absL2
18η˜1η˜2
+ O(Lµ3 + L2µ4). (C.13)
Therefore, r¯ ∗tag becomes a good approximation of rtag when µ ≪ L−1/2 and the absorber is
chosen to satisfy η˜absµ ≪ L−2.
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